# Explaining divergent transformation paths in Tunisia and Egypt: The role of inter-elite trust

Hassan, Mazen; Lorch, Jasmin; Ranko, Annette

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
2020, VOL. 25, NO. 5, 553–578
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1614819

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group



# Explaining divergent transformation paths in Tunisia and Egypt: The role of inter-elite trust

Mazen Hassan[a], Jasmin Lorch[b] and Annette Ranko[c]

[a]Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt; [b]GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany; [c]Department of European and International Cooperation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Amman, Jordan

**ABSTRACT**

This article analyses why the political transformations following the Arab Spring took different paths in Egypt and Tunisia. Based on data from field interviews conducted between 2012 and 2018 as well as press analyses, we argue that a strong factor why Tunisia was more successful in establishing democracy is that it had a higher level of inter-elite trust. Moreover, we show that the establishment of inter-elite trust depends on the presence of functioning trust-building arenas during the transition and the early democratic consolidation period. To investigate the role of inter-elite trust, we develop a theoretical-analytical framework, drawing on Arab Spring literature, transition theory, scholarship on democratic consolidation, and research on trust.

**KEYWORDS** Democratization; elites; trust; Egypt; Tunisia; Arab Spring

A plethora of thought-provoking works have tried to explain the success – or more often failure – of democratization in authoritarian regimes whose rule was challenged by the Arab Spring uprisings from 2011 onwards (e.g., Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Cavatorta, 2015; Heydemann, 2016; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Within this literature, some authors rely on actor-centred approaches to explain why Tunisia has democratized while other countries have either returned to authoritarian rule or experienced civil wars (e.g., Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Heydemann, 2016). Others, by contrast, argue that long-term structural factors were more important in determining both the breakdown (or resilience) of authoritarian regimes and the success (or failure) of the sometimes ensuing democratic experiments (e.g., Masoud, 2014; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015).

Within transition theory, however, there is broad-based agreement that *elite actors* play a crucial role during one important phase of transformation: the interval between the breakdown of the old authoritarian regime and the

**CONTACT** Jasmin Lorch jasmin.lorch@giga-hamburg.de

passage of a new constitution (Geddes, 1999, p. 120, pp. 136–137; see e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1970; Zayed, 2005). Yet, a better understanding of the behaviour of Arab elites during this interval in Arab Spring countries requires more investigation (see also Heydemann, 2016, pp. 202–203).

Comparing Tunisia and Egypt is theoretically intriguing in this regard. Until early 2013, the two countries shared many similarities. In both cases, the old authoritarian regimes presided over relatively strong state apparatuses. However, neither regime could draw on oil rents to permanently secure the loyalty of the security forces, or establish undisputed hereditary successions. Thus, when confronted with strong popular uprisings, their militaries sided with the protesters or remained neutral, forcing incumbent autocrats to resign (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Both countries subsequently held free elections to assemblies charged with drafting new constitutions. In both countries Islamist parties won these founding elections and assumed office. Nevertheless, Tunisia institutionalized a democratic system, while Egypt's post-Mubarak trajectory experienced significant setbacks. Our research goal is to determine why this was the case.

While in both countries secularist and Islamist elites were initially highly polarized, a compromise between both camps strongly contributed to making the Tunisian transition succeed, whereas the absence of such a compromise hindered Egypt's democratic experiment (Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016, pp. 14–15; Boubekeur, 2016). It has been cursorily argued that deep 'distrust' (Stepan & Linz, 2013, p. 23) prevented Islamist and secularist elites from negotiating a settlement in Egypt, while the Islamists' and secularists' efforts to overcome their mutual 'distrust' enabled an elite compromise in Tunisia (Stepan, 2012, p. 92). Nevertheless, the role of *inter-elite trust* in influencing the political transformation processes in Tunisia and Egypt – as well as in other Arab Spring cases – has not yet been systematically explored. This deficit corresponds to a similar gap in the broader research on democratic transformation, which has attributed huge importance to 'elite pacts' (Geddes, 1999, pp. 120, 136–137; e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 2013) without paying adequate attention to the role of inter-elite trust in the forging of such pacts. Several studies on democracy emphasize the importance of citizens' trust in the political system. Social capital theory, in particular, assumes that voluntary associations in civil society generate mutual trust between citizens, thereby strengthening democratic institutions (e.g., Putnam, 1993, 2000). However, researchers are yet to thoroughly examine how trust (or distrust) between *elites* impacts democratic transformations.

This article seeks to fill these gaps by asking two main questions. To what extent can inter-elite trust (or distrust) explain the distinct transformation paths in Egypt and Tunisia in the three years following the removal of their former authoritarian rulers? And what conditions enabled or prevented the building of inter-elite trust?

## Political elites, trust, and democratization: Towards a theoretical-analytical model and research methodology

The pre-eminent role of elites during democratic transitions and the early democratic consolidation period, when the institutions of the old regime are dissolved or restricted and new rules of the political game are yet to be established, is undisputed in transition theory and the broader democratization literature (e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; Munck & Leff, 1997; O'Donnell et al., 2013; Rustow, 1970). Leading transition scholars have shown that this wisdom remains relevant regarding the Arab Spring (Stepan & Linz, 2013) with even proponents of structuralist explanations recognizing this finding (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015, pp. 186–198). While in transition theory the concept of 'elite' is rarely precisely defined, we draw on Asseburg and Wimmen (Asseburg & Wimmen 2016, p. 5) to focus on those elite actors 'who yield significant influence over the political process'[1] during the transformation period. Moreover, in line with Geddes' (1999, p. 136) finding that '[s]uccessful pact making seems to require the prior existence of well-organized parties able to make and keep commitments', we analyse political party elites as one important sub-section of the national elite, while nevertheless constructing a theoretical-analytical framework that is broad enough to also include other types of political elites.

Political negotiations by post-transition elites commonly include highly contentious issues, such as creating constitution-drafting mechanisms, structuring new institutions, and determining whether and what limits should be placed on religious, military, and security institutions. Such controversial matters normally have to be resolved through *compromises* rather than zero-sum approaches (Hassan, 2013a), requiring elite adversaries to cooperate. As early as 1970, Rustow (1970, p. 358) stressed the necessity of a 'first grand compromise that establishes democracy.' If major elite sections fail to reach such a compromise, powerful veto players – such as the military – can intervene to block democratization.

But what are the conditions that enable such compromise? Research on trust shows that trust is usually the 'precursor' of compromise and consensus building (Leach & Sabatier, 2005, p. 491). Defined, rather minimally, as 'having faith or confidence in another's propensity to keep promises, to negotiate honestly, and to show respect for other points of view' (ibid: 492), trust is especially important in periods of uncertainty (McKnight & Chervany, 1996, p. 3) – such as political transformations. Our theoretical-analytical model thus assumes that successful democratic transformations often depend on a reasonable degree of inter-elite trust.

This corresponds with the literature on 'power sharing', which shows that inter-elite trust and the readiness of opposing elites to express less confrontational views of each other contribute to promoting stability and democratic

consolidation (Bunte & Vinson, 2016; Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). Our first assumption also corresponds with the broader finding of the democratization literature that trust (in the form of social capital or citizens' trust in the political system) generally strengthens democracy (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Moreover, transition theory has also occasionally acknowledged the necessity of inter-elite trust in principle. In 1999, Diamond (1999, pp. 207–208) noted that

> 'trust in people may merit more sustained investigation. … If rival political elites do not trust one another to honour agreements, it will be much more difficult for them to institutionalize the pacts, settlements, understandings and mutual restraints that stabilize politics and consolidate democracy at the elite level'.

But how is inter-elite trust established? Trust literature indicates that interpersonal trust is built through regular, direct interactions and face-to-face communication, while clear rules and institutional frameworks governing these interactions help to encourage trustworthiness (Leach & Sabatier, 2005, pp. 492–93; see also Rothstein, 2000). Thereby, trust evolves gradually and is strengthened the more frequently individuals interact and the longer their relationship lasts. By contrast, if fora that encourage trust building are lacking – or are replaced by trust-inhibiting frameworks – trust and cooperation often break down. Our second assumption, therefore, is that compromises between post-transition elites are enabled when *functioning trust-building arenas* exist during the transition and the early democratic consolidation period. We construct our heuristic theoretical-analytical model as follows outlined in figure 1.

To trace the presence (or absence) of these two trajectories in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, we rely on process tracing in the form of theoretical-analytic explanation (George & Bennett, 2005, esp. 207ff.), following the example of well-known scholars who have applied the process-tracing method to cases of democratic transformation (e.g., Brownlee, 2007, esp. 32–42).

Our comparative analysis also gauges the explanatory value of this theoretical-analytical model against that of three other variables that the literature has found to influence the establishment of elite compromises.




Figure 1. Trust and transitions.

The first is the distribution of power between competing elites (e.g., Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 345). Much transition literature assumes that a stalemate of power between opposing elites is conducive to elite pacts (McFaul, 2002, p. 213). However, MacFaul's (2002) analysis of the former Soviet Union shows that where authoritarian regimes have crumbled due to revolutionary mass protests such power stalemates often lead to protracted conflict rather than democracy. This finding is relevant for Arab Spring countries in which authoritarian rulers were likewise ousted through mass demonstrations. Secondly, we examine the intervening role of the military in politics (e.g., Silverman, 2012), specifically with regard to how far it can enhance or inhibit trust-building among party elites. And, thirdly, we assess the influence of regional and international actors. McFaul (2002, pp. 241–242), for example, finds that proximity to the West and the prospect of access to Western institutions, such as the EU, can significantly strengthen democratic transformation processes.

To test our argument, we draw on altogether 40 interviews conducted with party elites in Tunisia and Egypt between 2012 and 2018, which we complemented with 3 interviews conducted with local experts. Undoubtedly, interviews reflect interviewees' perceptions of events and/or other individuals and, therefore, provide subjective rather than objective accounts of political developments. However, trust – or distrust – is deeply affected by such perceptions, making elite interviewing an appropriate method for our research question. Although the majority of our interviews were conducted after 2013, the ones conducted in 2012 in Egypt indicate that the post-2013 accounts by our interviewees are not just ex-post rationalisations of the events. Moreover, we triangulated our interview evidence with the analysis of public statements made by relevant elites between 2011 and 2014. For each country, around 100 Arabic-language party elites' statements in the press or party press releases were analysed and strongly corroborated the interview data.

Our sample of political elites includes leading members of the main Islamist and secularist parties whom we treat as representatives of the different ideological strands of political party elites in both countries. For Egypt, we incorporated members of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the Salafist *al-Nour* Party and the more moderate *al-Wasat* Party from the Islamist camp; representatives of *al-Wafd*, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), and the Constitution Party (CP) from the secularist, liberal camp; members of *al-Karama*, Popular Current (PC), the Socialist Popular Alliance Party (SPAP), and *Tagammu'* from the secularist, leftist camp; and representatives of the Citizen Party and *al-Muatamar* from the old regime elite (for a complete list of parties on both divides, see Rabie, 2012; Saleh, 2013). For Tunisia, the sample comprises members of the Islamist party Ennahda. From the secularist parties, we included representatives of Nidaa Tounes (NT), which comprises members of the former Ben Ali regime; leaders

from the centre-left Congress Party for the Republic (CPR), Ettakatol, and the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP); and representatives from three major far-left parties within the Popular Front (PF): the Workers' Party, the Democratic Patriots' Movement, and *al-Qotb* (see appendix 1).

For both countries, our observation focussed especially on the period when both Islamist and secularist party elites participated in the forging of rules for a new regime, that is, the interval from the fall of Mubarak to Morsi's 2012 constitutional declaration in the Egyptian case and the period of the Constituent Assembly and the National Dialogue in the case of Tunisia.

## Egypt

Prior to the Tahrir protests that toppled the Mubarak regime in February 2011, there was not much cooperation between secularist and Islamist elites in Egypt. The last joint electoral platform between Islamist and secularist opposition elites dates back to 1984 when the then main liberal *al-Wafd* Party allied with the then banned MB (Helal, 2010). In many subsequent elections secularist and Islamist elites accused each other of having struck a deal with the regime at the other side's expense. Outside parliament there were periods of cooperation between the MB and some secularist opposition elites – most notably, the Enough (*Kefaya*) movement and 'The National Association for Change' in the mid and late 2000s. However, such rapprochements remained 'covered by suspicions'[2] and were mainly kept together by the protagonists' common opposition to Mubarak. Islamists also opined that some secularists enjoyed too close relationships with the pre-2011 regime and thus could not be trusted. One Islamist leader, interviewed in October 2012, said that 'many of the seculars and liberals have been aligned with despotism since the [early 1990s].'[3]

> Following the ouster of Mubarak, relations between secularist and Islamist elites became highly competitive, and both camps often refrained from pursuing agreements with each other in favour of seeking bilateral deals with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) – which controlled the political process in 2011/2012 – usually behind each other's back. An SDP founding member argued that 'right after the revolution, secularists were still distrustful of Islamists'.[4] Similarly, a founding member of the FJP and cabinet member under Morsi indicated that a short-lived alliance with the secularist, leftist *al-Karama* Party in the 2011/2012 elections 'was no real cooperation. Instead they [*al-Karama*] just used us as a ladder'.[5] A leading Salafi politician, interviewed in October 2012, said that Islamists 'could not ally with [secularists] because they have a different identity … and view us as extremists'[6] Shortly after Mubarak's departure, secularists and Islamists already started to separate their protests from each other, even when they had similar goals. 'We intentionally didn't share demonstrations with liberals [secularists] because we had the impression that they did not want the interest of the country. They have other objectives and wanted to take advantage of our mobilizational capacity to forward their agenda … All they want is to tarnish us', said a Salafi leader.[7]

Distrust between secularist and Islamist elites increased as several attempts at cooperation failed. One such effort was as early as February 2011 when the National Association for Change called on all political parties and movements to draft a common vision for the future. As per a leader of the SPAP:

> 'a document was drafted that requested SCAF to form a presidential committee of five members, a government of national salvation, and a committee to write the constitution. … But although the MB participated in drafting this document, one week later, we were surprised to know that they had presented another document to SCAF, which was different, if not contradictory, to the first document.'.[8]

Another attempt at cooperation came in March 2011 during the debates preceding the first constitutional referendum. According to a long-time leader of the leftist *al-Tagammu'* Party, secularists and Islamists held over 32 meetings to agree on the content of the constitutional amendments. The settlement stipulated that 50 per cent of the Constituent Assembly seats would be allocated to 'civil' [non-Islamist] and 50 per cent to Islamist parties. 'But then *al-Wafd* and the MB struck a secret deal whereby they counted *al-Wasat* as a civil party, thereby giving a majority to the Islamists'.[9] Distrust thus also prevailed amongst secularist elites themselves.

A leading member of the MB's Shura Council, interviewed in 2012, indicated that the SCAF's cementing of distrust between Islamists and secularists started in early 2011 when

> 'SCAF was telling the Islamists that they needed them because they were the forces capable of ensuring stability while simultaneously having parallel meetings with liberals [secularists] to frighten them from Islamists by emphasizing the dangers of extremism'.[10]

This shows how the SCAF's role during the interim period promoted distrust between political foes, a pattern that continued till the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections. As per a leftist politician,

> 'the MB and the military were allies [back then]. During the [2011] parliamentary elections, this alliance was very obvious. I was working in the electoral district of North Cairo which was designed to include 3 million voters. All political parties opposed the drawing of the district boundaries in this manner which was imposed by SCAF .... Only the MB was the winner from this strategy'.[11]

Another driver of distrust was a document on supra-constitutional principles developed in March 2012 by the then SCAF-appointed deputy prime minister. The document included principles to guide the constitution-making process – which Islamists were expected to dominate – and proposed reserved powers for the military but trimmed powers for religious institutions. Expectedly, the document was accepted by secularists and rejected by Islamists, prompting a leading MB member – interviewed in November 2012 – to state that 'this

document should never have gained the acceptance of any force but we were surprised that some liberal [secularist] forces accepted it.[12]

However, from early 2011 to late 2012, not all secularists held the same all-negative view of Islamists. Instead, the secularists were split into two camps: camp (i) whose representatives were highly sceptical of Islamists – such as leaders of the FEP, al-Tagammu', and the Citizen Party, and camp (ii) whose members believed that Islamists (especially MB and FJP Islamists) could be worked with, such as leaders of the SDP, *al-Wafd, al-Karama*, the PC, and the Constitution Party.

The two camps differed in their views on how far Islamists could be trusted as sincere political players. The sceptical camp (i) did not view Islamist parties as political forces with genuine popular support[13] but rather as securing their electoral successes via nondemocratic means such as buying voters. Similarly, it regarded the Islamists' mobilization tactics as 'worse than those of the former National Democratic Party' (NDP).[14] This camp also did not perceive Islamists as patriotic actors but as forces seeking to incite civil strife between Egypt's Christian minority and its Muslim majority with the sole aim of erecting a theocratic state. During the 2012 presidential election, a founding member of the FEP argued that if Morsi won, Egyptians 'would be facing a "*welayat al-Faqih*"' state like Iran and 'the constitution of Egypt would be the Quran'.[15] As per a secularist activist interviewed a few weeks after Morsi's inauguration in 2012, 'if the Brotherhood managed to dominate the syndicates, the parliament and the presidency, we will not have a civic state even if the constitution strictly stipulates one'.[16] The MB was never viewed by this camp as willing to reach a consensus with any secular political force,[17] but rather as a totalitarian movement seeking to 'control the people in a fascist and unjust dictatorship'.[18]

In contrast, the less sceptical camp (ii) initially had a more positive view of Islamist elites. A founding member of *al-Karama* Party argued that he disagreed with the MB 'with regard to their political vision, and how they dominated state institutions after their ascent to power' but never 'questioned their patriotism.'[19] Elite members of this camp also concurred that Islamists enjoyed genuine popular support, adhered to basic democratic principles, and were legitimate political actors. According to a senior *al-Wafd* member, although his party would not form an electoral coalition with the MB, it could cooperate with them on bills, following the conventional practices in parliament.[20] However, the discourse of the less sceptical secular elite camp took a turn after 2012 (e.g., SDP Press Release, 2 December 2012).[21]

One crucial institutional reason why trust between secularist and Islamist elites further deteriorated following Mubarak's departure is that the two elite groups never had much time to interact and build mutual trust after the transition. The ideal arena for that – parliament – did not survive long enough to perform this function, as its lower chamber was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court in June 2012, only six months after it had been elected.

Moreover, with very few exceptions, parliament did not deal with controversial pieces of legislation on which secularists and Islamists were in great disagreement. Hence, Islamist and secularist elites hardly had the opportunity or need to build consensus. A SPAP leader claimed that 'the parliamentary experience was too short. . ., the issues that emerged in Parliament did not unravel the differences in the ideologies and programmes [of Islamists and secularists].'[22] Similar views were echoed by Islamists. According to a leading representative of the Salafist *al-Nour* Party, secularist and Islamist elites attempted to cooperate during the constitution-drafting process but failed:

> 'During the 2012 parliament we were attending confidential meetings for a month to make sure that the constituent assembly would include the MB, *al-Nour*, and secularist parties, and to make sure that all figures were accepted from all parties … [and] to get consensus especially around the controversial articles. At this time, we got the approval of all parties for the article concerning *sharia*. We were then very surprised to see all [secularist] parties withdrawing [from the assembly]'. [23]

The controversial constitution-writing process was delegated to another body, a constituent assembly chosen by parliament, which, however, was also dissolved by court order shortly afterwards. Moreover, the six months in which parliament sat were also the months leading to the first presidential election after 2011. Thus, political foes either preferred to wait until after the election before investing in cross-ideological cooperation or were busy preparing for the election. Consequently, even before Morsi became president in June 2012, there was no forum to force secularist and Islamist elites to sit together and interact. In the period between Mubarak's departure in February 2011 and Morsi's removal in July 2013, the major part of Egypt's secularist and Islamist elite sat together in parliament for less than five months. This lack of functioning arenas for inter-elite trust building made it very difficult for Islamist and secularist elites to develop mutual trust.

Although parliament's upper chamber, elected in January 2012, remained in session after the lower house was dissolved, it had much more skewed representation – with Islamists controlling over 85 per cent of its seats – and was rather powerless, even after it was abruptly given legislative powers. Deadlock inside the upper house was fostered as secularist party elites viewed the MB as 'not willing to compromise'.[24] According to a leading PC member, the MB 'never sought real cooperation' in the upper chamber but 'dealt with it as if they owned it and … relied on [their] organizational capacity to achieve this'.[25] An SDP founding member indicated that parliamentary sessions were marked by 'cold discussions under an atmosphere of huge distrust.'[26] Moreover, media soon replaced parliament as the main arena for interaction. This prompted both secularist and Islamist leaders to express even more polarizing views of each

other to score points in public. A leading representative of the *Muatamar* Party claimed that since then 'there was no cooperation, only conflict'.[27]

The split between Islamist and secularist elites was also propelled by the Islamists' view of their secularist opponents. The MB was very sceptical of forces that had been close to the Mubarak regime. Leading MB representatives also displayed huge distrust of the FEP and especially its founder Naguib Sawiris, the Coptic business tycoon, arguing that he 'instrumentalized the media to incite the Christian minority against the MB and the Salafists'.[28] Nevertheless, secularist and Islamist elites made a last attempt to cooperate before the second round of the 2012 presidential election. In the so-called Fairmont Declaration, secularists and Islamists agreed to back Morsi over Ahmed Shafik, who was viewed as a continuation of the Mubarak regime. The agreement was written and signed by Morsi himself.[29] This support by secularist elites for Morsi was conditional on creating a balanced constituent assembly, appointing a prime minister on whom all elite forces could agree, and appointing four vice-presidents (including one Copt and one woman). Soon, however, secularist elites accused the MB of reneging on its promises. A leading member of *al-Wafd* Party's Supreme Committee contended that the MB violated the Fairmont Declaration, and hence 'all political forces lost faith and trust in the MB as they broke all their promises'.[30]

Conversely, the MB viewed the secularist parties as determined to make the Morsi presidency fail from the start. As per a member of the Brotherhood Shura Council, interviewed in November 2012, 'many [secularists] refused to join the Morsi cabinet after the election. Where is patriotism and serving Egypt in that?'[31] This incident – and subsequent unsuccessful invitations for dialogue from Morsi – point to a distinction between trust generation and trust-inducing behaviours. Specifically, although there might be opportunities for trust building, if the behaviour of one party is self-contradictory, such opportunities are unlikely to actually generate trust. The behaviour of Morsi while in power – especially following the constitutional declaration in November 2012, with which he set his decisions above judicial review – was such that secularists were unlikely to trust his invitations for cooperation irrespective of the opportunities that the latter might have represented. Other examples include Morsi's defiant removal of the Prosecutor General and his direct attack against the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Indeed, party statements show that the discourse of the formerly less sceptical secularist camp (ii) took a turn after Morsi's constitutional declaration. Specifically, camp (ii) started to view the MB as an illegitimate political actor. First, it argued that the MB had lost its 'moral legitimacy'[32] because it sought to monopolize power and failed to cooperate with secularists in the interim period. Then, it denied that the MB had *electoral* legitimacy, arguing that Morsi was following the orders of the MB's Supreme Guide who held no electoral mandate. Ousting Morsi would consequently be 'admissible from

a democratic point of view' (SDP Press Release, 8 July 2013). Leaders of the SDP went on to claim that the MB's constitutional declaration was 'a coup against Egypt as a whole' (SDP Press Release 2, December 2012). This rapprochement between the formerly less sceptical secularist camp (ii) and the sceptical secularist camp (i) peaked in summer 2013 and ultimately culminated in massive protests that prepared the ground for Morsi's ouster. Most secularist elites shifted from labelling the MB and the Islamists aligned with it as 'illegitimate political actors' to calling them 'terrorists' and 'murderers' (e.g., SDP Press Release, 8 July 2013). In this context, the military came forward as the protector of the anti-MB forces and, following Morsi's ouster, assumed power in an interim-period that was followed by the election of General al-Sisi. From late 2012 onwards, the MB's discourse also sharpened. Leading MB members argued that former NDP forces and other elements of the 'deep state' were planning to stage a counter-revolution (e.g., MB/FJP Press Release, 29 June 2013).[33] The MB also began to denounce all criticism against itself as 'conspiracies' and projected an image of an existential battle between itself and the elite forces loyal to the old regime.

Other factors also negatively affected trust building in Egypt. Firstly, given that Islamists won around 70 per cent of the seats (and 65 per cent of the votes) in the first post-Mubarak election (Hassan, 2013b) – and scored similarly strong victories in the constitutional referendums of March 2011 and December 2012 – they had no real incentive to invest in building trust and compromise across the ideological aisle. Moreover, distrust between secularist and Islamist party elites was echoed and sometimes encouraged by party members, media circles and/or business and civil society actors affiliated with each party bloc. One famous chanting slogan in the MB's pro-Morsi demonstrations was 'Be mad President', an appeal for Morsi to be tougher and more assertive towards secularists. Conversely, secular media was over-sympathetic with secularist parties and 'gave them space and even asked them to be more vocal against Islamists'.[34]

Finally, regional powers had their role. With the Brotherhood enjoying close relationships with the Qatari regime and anti-MB forces receiving signals from the Saudi and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) governments that they could depend on financial backing if they stepped up their opposition to Morsi, additional trust-inhibiting forces were at play. As per official Egyptian figures, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided Egypt with more than $ UD 21 billions of financial aid between 2011 and 2014,[35] indicating their huge influence. With both the secularist and the Islamist camp having a possible external bail-out of the economy if they governed, the urge to compromise was reduced.

## Tunisia

Tunisia's post-transition elites had more prior interaction compared to Egypt's, which contributed to the building of personal ties and minimal mutual trust before the transition. In October 2005, Ennahda negotiated a joint platform with the then main secularist opposition parties (the CPR, Ettakatol, the PDP, and the Workers' Party, which held seats in the 2011 Constituent Assembly). The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia, which comprised different secularist and Islamist opposition forces, issued a communiqué covering several crucial issues, such as women's rights, and the relationship between state and religion (Stepan, 2012). Meherzia Labidi, the first vice president of the Constituent Assembly from Ennahda, stated that this facilitated cooperation in the Constituent Assembly after 2011, 'as many of us [secularist and Islamist deputies] already knew each other, and some of us had built personal ties'.[36] This is in strong contrast to Egypt, where rapprochements between Islamist and secularist elites before 2011 never developed into an ideological agreement on how society should be governed but, instead, just constituted temporary alliances to oppose the Mubarak regime.

The moderation of Ennahda, including the party's renunciation of the violent forms of resistance it had sometimes employed in the 1980s and 1990s and its increased openness to democratic rule, was crucial in enabling trust building among the opposition (Angrist 2013, pp. 556–559). Moreover, during the repression of Ennahda in the 1990s, some of its leaders joined secular political parties or civil society organizations (CSOs) (ibid.: 558), including the powerful labour union Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT).[37] Hamza Hamza, a former member of Ennahda's central committee, for instance, joined the PDP (ibid.). In addition, some secularist and Islamist opposition leaders liaised in exile, such as Ennahda's leader Rachid Ghannouchi and the CPR's party president Moncef Marzouki in France.[38] Such interactions facilitated the building of trust after the transition.

The establishment of the 18 October Coalition signalled the emergence of a more unified opposition to the Ben Ali regime. Consequently, Abderrahim Zouari and Mohamed Ghériani, both of whom acted as Secretary Generals of the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) for some time, held informal negotiations with Rachid Ghannouchi in the United Kingdom aimed at luring Ennahda away from the 18 October Coalition and dividing the opposition.[39] Moreover, Islamist and RCD leaders were sometimes connected through family and/or personal ties as exemplified by Ben Ali's Prime Minister Hamed Karoui who was acquainted to the later Ennahda Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali through his son who was a former Ennahda activist (*Kapitalis,* 5 September 2012). Such informal interactions – which were not paralleled in the Egyptian case – contributed to the establishment of both personal contacts and a culture of

political negotiation that facilitated inter-elite trust building in formal arenas after the transition.

Like in Egypt, the post-2011 secularist elite in Tunisia consisted of camp (i), which comprised political leaders more sceptical of Ennahda (e.g., leaders of far-leftist parties within the PF, such as the Workers' Party, the Democratic Patriots' Movement, and *al-Qotb*), and camp (ii), which comprised political leaders less sceptical of Ennahda – such as leading representatives of the CPR, Ettakatol, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and NT. NT, founded in 2012, comprised two large blocs: old regime elites and leftist leaders with roots in the workers' movement and the UGTT.[40]

Generally, however, secularist and Islamist elites in Tunisia have embraced more positive views of each 'other' than their Egyptian counterparts. For instance, Tunisian president and NT leader, Beji Caid Essebsi, stated that 'there is some backwardness [within Ennahda] but not to a suicidal extent', adding that Ennahda was ultimately most interested in electoral success.[41] Moreover, NT's leaders do not necessarily view Ennahda's Islamist nature as a problem, as long as the party adopts a moderate view of Islam and explicitly distances itself from violent Islamists. For Essebsi, 'there are two versions of Islam: a violent, misled one and a moderate one, true to Tunisian culture'.[42] While there were supporters of both views within Ennahda, he explained, it was important that the moderates had the upper hand. Moreover, several elites within the less sceptical secularist camp (ii) have viewed Ennahda principally as a legitimate political actor, such as leaders of the DA, the CPR, and Ettakatol.[43]

In their discourse, key Ennahda leaders also displayed higher levels of trust of secularist elites than the MB in Egypt and continuously stressed their desire for 'consensus' and 'dialogue' with their secularist opponents (e.g., Ennahda Press Releases, 9 May 2013; 11 January 2014). However, although important Ennahda leaders described old regime figures within NT, such as Essebsi, as trustworthy politicians,[44] several segments in the party feared that the old regime forces within NT wanted to drive Ennahda underground.[45]

> The post-transition institutional setting in Tunisia, unlike that in Egypt, has provided Islamist and secularist elites with multiple arenas in which they have interacted almost continuously since 2011, facilitating the building of mutual trust. In early 2011, the Ben Achour Commission, under the interim government of Essebsi, crafted the rules for both the first democratic elections and the Constituent Assembly charged with drafting the new constitution. The commission included members of all political parties and acted as a highly 'effective consensus-building bod[y]' (Stepan, 2012, p. 92). The continuous interaction between secularist and Islamist elites increased trust between segments of Ennahda and the old regime elite of the RCD, now represented in NT. According to Said Aidi, a NT cabinet member in the second transitional government of 2011: 'contacts with Ennahda were already built when we

> handed over [Essebsi's interim] government to the [Ennahda-led] troika … we then also continued to meet them, for example, at receptions or on talk shows'.[46]

More importantly, the Constituent Assembly ran from its election in October 2011 until it approved the constitution in early 2014. It enabled regular face-to-face communication between secularist and Islamist party leaders, facilitating higher levels of trust. Moreover, from 2011 to 2014, Ennahda governed as part of a troika with the secularist CPR and Ettakatol whose establishment was facilitated by the pre-existing personal relations between Rachid Ghannouchi and Moncef Marzouki.[47] According to Said Aidi from NT, Minister of Employment in the second transition government, this readiness to refrain from monopolizing executive power distinguished Ennahda from the behaviour of the MB and Morsi in Egypt.[48] Accordingly, it was crucial in enabling secularist elites to develop trust in Ennahda. An Ettakatol member explained that although Ennahda's programme was totally different from that of Ettakatol, she could work with Ennahda, because it did not monopolize power when in office.[49] The fact that Ennahda held proportionally less parliamentary seats than the MB did in Egypt played an important role in that. According to a Tunisian expert 'Ennahda never sought to dominate because they knew they wouldn't be able to numerically. In Egypt, however, the Brotherhood had the numbers that enabled them to dominate.'[50]

The Constituent Assembly was an arena for discussion on controversial issues on which Islamist and secularist elites had to find consensus. A 'consensus committee' was formed inside the assembly. Noura Ben Hassen, a CPR deputy in the Constituent Assembly, explained that:

> 'parties were not represented [in this committee] according to their seat shares in the assembly, but more equally. Whenever there was deadlock in the discussions on the floor, we took things to this committee and then discussed the issue until we reached consensus'.[51]

According to Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou, a leader and deputy of the DA, a famous example of such a consensus was the removal of references to *sharia* from the constitution,[52] which again showed secularist elites that Ennahda was willing to make serious concessions (Angrist, 2013, p. 562). In Egypt, by contrast, the share of Islamists in the first Constituent Assembly exceeded their seat share in the 2012 parliament. Moreover, within Tunisia's Constituent Assembly, shifting coalitions were formed and sometimes cut across the Islamist–secularist divide, enhancing the development of mutual trust. For instance, some Ennahda deputies voted – together with secularist deputies – against a paragraph stipulating the 'complementary' - rather than equal - role of women into the constitution.[53]

When discussions within the assembly reached a stalemate in mid-2013 – after Ennahda had presented a draft constitution considered as too Islamist by many secularist party elites and after two leftist opposition leaders were assassinated by violent Salafists – polarization between secularists and Islamists increased again, threatening to derail the transition. Various secularist parties and CSOs, including the UGTT, demonstrated for the ouster of the troika, while Ennahda supporters staged protests in support of the government. Concurrently, both international donors and businessmen formerly close to the Ben Ali regime, who had initially supported the Ennahda government in exchange for its adherence to a liberal economic agenda, began to withdraw their support from Ennadha (Boubekeur, 2015, p. 3–4). During the 2013 crisis, Ennahda's harshest critics (leading PF members) in the sceptical camp (i) accused Ennahda of 'monopolis[ing] power and decision making inside the Constituent Assembly' and of side-lining secularist forces (e.g., PF Press Release, 1 July 2013). Some believed that Ennahda had links to terrorists and shared some responsibility for the murders of the two leftist politicians (e.g., PF Press Release, 3 October 2013), but they never described the party as a terrorist organization in and of itself (e.g., PF Press Release, 3 July 2014). In fact, the PF condemned the violent clearance of the pro-Morsi protests in Egypt in 2013 (e.g., PF Press Release, 16 August 2013) and called for the MB's reintegration into the political process, signalling Ennahda that even its strongest critics would not criminalize it.

Moreover, elites of the less sceptical secularist camp (ii), such as NT, the DA, the CPR, and Ettakatol, continued to view Ennahda as a legitimate political actor.[54] For instance, Ettakatol leader Elias Fakhfakh, the then minister of finance, stated that to solve the crisis, there was 'no solution without Ennahda'.[55] Other secularist elites from the less sceptical camp also continued to acknowledge Ennahda's strong popular support and democratic election successes.[56]

In this situation, the National Dialogue led by the so-called Quartet of CSOs that included the UGTT brought the adversaries together for several months of talks. The UGTT had maintained significant autonomy from the Ben Ali regime and its union structures had provided the organizational backbone of the Arab Spring demonstrations that had led to his fall (Angrist, 2013, pp. 559–561). Moreover, in 2013, it was among the most influential organizations that protested against the troika. Thus, the UGTT had both the moral and the mobilizational leverage to pressure the competing elite camps, and the Ennahda government in particular, to come to one table and negotiate seriously with each other. Once the National Dialogue was established, the UGTT was directly involved and the negotiation skills of its General Secretary Houcine Abassi contributed significantly to the dialogue's success.[57]

Within the National Dialogue process, another consensus committee was formed *outside* the Constituent Assembly,[58] enabling agreements on previously unresolved issues so that the constitution – which, even according to critics, constituted the 'expression of a compromise between culturally different groups' (Redissi 2016, p. 20) – could be finalized in 2014.

Prior to the compromise between the main secularist and Islamist elites, there was a stalemate of power between the two sides and given the extensive mobilization of both secularist and Islamist activists, open conflict rather than cooperation might well have emerged. However, according to Ennahda's leader Rachid Ghannouchi, Ennahda realized that it had lost the support of many Tunisians, owing to its inability to address important popular needs.[59] Leaders of NT, for their part, did not hold executive power and were afraid of being marginalized from formal politics[60] if the transition continued without their participation. Moreover, both secularist and Islamist elites sought to avoid chaos, civil war and a disruption of the transition[61] and still trusted that their ideological adversaries would want to do the same. For instance, Rafik Abdelsalam, the former foreign minister from Ennahda, concurred that there was some trust between Ennahda and NT that was 'built' through 'dialogue', while adding that other Arab Spring cases showed that Tunisia's political leaders either had to face the risk of civil war or military rule 'or sit on the table and reach a compromise – [so] there [was] no other alternative'.[62]

Equally important, the army refrained from intervening in politics and allowed for the National Dialogue and other trust-building arenas to function. Nevertheless, leading Ennahda members were anxious 'to avoid the Egyptian scenario'[63] and, according to former Prime Minister Ali Larayed, Ennahda leaders did not want a coup in Tunisia.[64] Elite representatives of NT, in turn, were confident that Ennahda's leaders were rational political actors who would seek to avoid such an escalation.[65]

Moreover, following the moderation of Ennahda, the EU had established working relations with the Islamist party and supported Tunisia's democratic transformation (Colombo & Voltolini, 2017). In 2012, the EU had established a 'Privileged Partnership' with Tunisia and from 2011 to 2013 had provided the country with 445 million Euro in development assistance (ibid: 11). During the 2013 crisis, various international actors pressured both Ennahda and NT to seek a compromise (Boubekeur, 2015, p. 4). European actors in particular also facilitated interaction between the secularist and the Islamist elite camps. According to Rafik Abdelsalam from Ennahda, a meeting between Essebsi and Ghannoushi in Paris in August 2013 was crucial in convincing Ennahda to join the National Dialogue that finally ended the 2013 political crisis.[66] Once it had begun, the EU and other international actors supported the dialogue process through technical

measures and expertise, while also pressuring NT to compromise with Ennahda.[67]

After Ennahda and NT became the biggest forces in the 2014 elections and Ennahda joined the NT-led coalition government in 2015, elite representatives of both parties further increased their cooperation.[68] However, many activists in NT continued to disapprove of the 'consensus' with Ennahda, which Essebsi and other top-level leaders had forged without consulting the party's base.[69] Similarly, regarding the consensus, former Prime Minister Ali Larayed from Ennahda stated that 'of course, our [party] base [did] not accept such a project'. Describing Ennahda's hierarchical structure as having played an important role in enabling the compromise with NT, he elaborated that the party's leaders had discussed a lot with their rank and file until they had accepted it 'even if they don't understand'.[70]

## Conclusion

Following the Arab Spring, inter-elite trust between secularists and Islamists played a crucial role in enabling Tunisia's democratization process, while the lack of it contributed significantly to Egypt's democratic regression. As for the conditions that enabled, or prevented, the establishment of such inter-elite trust, our findings show that the presence (or absence) of functioning trust-building arenas in the period from the breakdown of the old authoritarian regimes to the passing of new constitutions played a key role. In Tunisia, various institutions enabled regular communication and face-to-face interactions between secularist and Islamist elites, promoting the building of inter-elite trust. In Egypt, the absence or dysfunction of such institutions prevented the establishment of inter-elite trust and, hence, political compromises between secularist and Islamist elites.

Concurrently, other variables also impacted the ability and the willingness of these competing political elites to interact in trust-building arenas. In particular, these were the differing political roles played by the two countries' armed forces, the distribution of power between the competing elite forces, and the intervening influence of key regional and international actors. Moreover, in the Tunisian case, *personal* contacts between *pre*-transition elites also facilitated the building of inter-elite trust after the end of authoritarianism. Future research should further explore how these other variables affect the building of inter-elite trust. Moreover, it should investigate in how far the theoretical-analytical model we developed to analyse the role of inter-elite trust also applies to political elites other than party elites.

On a broader theoretical level, our findings suggest that transition theory and the wider research on democratization, on the one hand, and the literature on trust, on the other, should be further integrated. Existing

research has comprehensively investigated the role that both trust within civil society and citizens' trust in political institutions can play in promoting democracy. However, there is a need to further explore the impact that interpersonal trust between political elites has on the prospects of democratic transition and long-term democratic consolidation.

Thereby, future research could also investigate the conditions under which inter-elite trust may not strengthen but rather weaken democratic consolidation – a research agenda that would correspond to calls to investigate the 'dark side of social capital' (here, the 'dark side' of social trust) at the level of (civil) society (e.g., Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010). In Tunisia, for instance, the coalition between elite representatives of NT and Ennahda in both parliament and government from 2015 onwards left the Tunisian polity without any meaningful political opposition, weakening Tunisia's multiparty system. Similarly, NT's and Ennahda's relationship at the elite level also prevented the two parties from meaningfully addressing several issues that are crucial for the consolidation of democracy, such as transitional justice, corruption and social inequality (Boubekeur, 2016). Moreover, in late 2018, discontent among NT members who had opposed the consensus with Ennahda but had been ignored by the party's elite combined with personal rivalries between Prime Minster Youssef Chaed and Hafez Chaed Essebsi, NT's Executive Director and Béji Caid Essebi's son, to cause a split within NT that ultimately also broke the relationship between Béji Caid Essebi and Ennahda's leader Rachid Ghannouchi at the elite level.[71]

Just like the role played by some of its followers in strengthening the uncompromising stance of the Egyptian MB, these dynamics show that political elites do not operate in a vacuum. Thus, future research should also explore how such elites are linked to their social constituencies and how these constituencies influence trust and cooperation at the elite level.

## Notes

1. Asseburg and Wimmen (2015, p. 5) use the term 'politically relevant elite'.
2. Interview, member, Supreme Committee, Wafd Party, Cairo, 31 August 2015.
3. Interview, Salafi leader and al-Nour deputy, Cairo, 15 October 2012.
4. Interview, SDP founding member, Cairo, 19 August 2015.
5. Interview, founding member FJP, Istanbul, 29 July 2015.
6. Interview, Salafi leader and al-Nour deputy, Cairo, 15 October 2012.
7. Ibid.
8. Interview, leader, SPAP, Cairo, 1 September 2015.
9. Interview, leading member, Tagammu' Party, Cairo, 31 August 2015.
10. Interview, MB Shura Council member, Cairo, 15 November 2012.
11. Interview, leading PC member, Cairo, 15 September 2015.
12. Interview, MB Shura Council member, Cairo, 15 November 2012.

13. Statement Naguib Sawiris, founding member, FEP, *Al-Yawm al-Sabeh*, 20 December 2012; statement Hassaballah, head Citizen Party (CP), *Karemalikom*, 23 June 2012.
14. Statement Salah Hassaballah, head, CP, *Al-Masry al-Yawm*, 26 December 2012.
15. Statement Naguib Sawiris, *Al-Masry al-Yawm*, 7 June 2012.
16. Interview, leader Revolutionary Socialists, Cairo, 23 October 2012.
17. Statement Rifaat al-Said, chairman, al-Tagammu', *Al-Masry al-Youm*, 28 August 2012.
18. Statement Najib Sawiris, *Al-Shourouq*, 20 June 2013.
19. Statement Hamdeen Sabbahi, *Masress*, 25 December 2012.
20. Statement Fouad al-Badrawy, *Al-Shorouk*, 11 September 2012.
21. See also e.g., statement Mohamed Abou El-Ghar, founding member, SDP, *Al-Ahaly;* SDP Press Release, 2 December 2012.
22. Interview, leader, SPAP, Cairo, 1 September 2015.
23. Interview, leading representative, al-Nour, Alexandria, 17 September 2015.
24. Interview, leading representative, SDP, Cairo, 18 August 2015.
25. Interview, leading PC member, Cairo, 15 September 2015.
26. Interview, SDP founding member, Cairo, 19 August 2015.
27. Interview, leading member, Muatamar Party, Cairo, 24 August 2015.
28. Statement MB, *Al-Yawm al-Sabeh*, 4 December 2011.
29. Interview, leading CP representative, Cairo, 31 August 2015.
30. Interview, leading member, al-Wafd Party, Cairo, 31 August 2015.
31. Interview, MB Shura Council member, Cairo, 15 November 2012.
32. Statement founding member, Karama Party; PC, *Masrawy*, 8 July 2013.
33. See also *Al-Asr*, 'Masr fi Mouwajahat "Junun" al-Thawra al-Mudada', 5 December 2012.
34. Interview, leading member, FEP, 27 February 2013.
35. Report by the Central Bank of Egypt, August 2016.
36. Interview, Meherzia Labidi, Tunis, 15 December 2014; see also interview, Firas Jabloun, Tunis, 16 December 2014; interview, Rafik Abdelsalam, former foreign minister 2011–2013, leading member, Ennahda, Tunis, 18 December 2014.
37. E.g., Interview, Meherzia Labidi, Tunis, 15 December 2014.
38. Telephone interview, Hatem Chakroun, researcher Observatoire Tunisien pour la Transition Démocratique, 24 November 2018.
39. Telephone interview, Hatem Chakroun, 24 November 2018; interview, Zouhair Ben Amor, elected representative, NT, Tunis, 30 September 2018; interview Mohamed Amine Echamekh, regional NT leader, Tunis, 15 November 2018 .
40. E.g., interview, Riadh Ben Fadhal, General Secretary, al-Qotb, Tunis, 28 August 2015.
41. Statement Beji Caid Essebsi, *Al-Sabah*, 31 December 2012.
42. Statement Beji Caid Essebsi, *Tunisien*, 30 October 2014.
43. Statement Beji Caid Essebsi, *Al-Sabah*, 31 December 2012.
44. Interview, Rafik Abdelsalam, 18 December 2014.
45. Ibid.
46. Interview, Said Aidi, Tunis, 15 December 2014.
47. Telephone interview, Hatem Chakroun, 24 November 2018.
48. Interview, Said Aidi, Tunis, 15 December 2014.
49. Interview, Wafa Madder, Tunis, 20 December 2014.
50. Interview, Hana Ben Abda, Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences, Tunis, 5 November 2014.

51. Interview, Noura Ben Hassen, Tunis, 17 December 2014.
52. Interview, Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou, Tunis, 15 December 2014.
53. Interview, Professor Mohamed Limam, al-Manar, Tunis, 7 November 2014.
54. Statement Beji Caid Essebsi, *Al-Sabah*, 31 December 2012.
55. Statement Eliyas Fakhfakh, *Al-Tunsia*, 23 February 2013.
56. Statement Beji Caid Essebsi, *Al-Chorouk*, 17 June 2012.
57. Interview, Zouhair Ben Amor, 30 September 2018.
58. Interview, Professor Hamadi Redissi, former member, NT, Tunis, 16 December 2014.
59. Interview, Rashid Ghannouchi, Tunis, 15 December 2014.
60. Interview, Zouhair Ben Amor, 30 September 2018.
61. Interview, Hamadi Redissi, Tunis, 16 December 2014.
62. Interview, Rafik Abdelsalam, 5 October 2016.
63. Interview, Hana Ben Abda, Tunis, 5 November 2014.
64. Interview, Ali Larayed, Tunis, 10 October 2016.
65. Interview, Zouhair Ben Amor, 30 September 2018.
66. Interview, Rafik Abdelsalam, Tunis, 18 December 2014.
67. Interview, Zouhair Ben Amor, 30 September 2018.
68. Interview, Riadh Ben Fadhal, Tunis, 28 August 2015.
69. See note 39.
70. Interview, Ali Larayed, Tunis, 10 October 2016.
71. See note 39.

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank May Darwich, Ellinor Zeino, Hatem Chakroun and the 'Project on Documenting the Revolution' at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, for their help in conducting and providing some interview material and Johannes Gerschewksi for providing input on an earlier version of this paper.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

## Funding

This work was supported by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) and the Science and Technology Development Fund (STDF) in Egypt [German Egyptian Mobility Program for Scientific Exchange and Excellence Development (GE-SEED), grant number 7973).

## ORCID

Jasmin Lorch http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9484-8701

## References

*Al-Masry al-Yawm* (2012, June 7) Najib Sawiris: Morsi lam Yanjah fi Tam'anat Ahad. Retrieved from https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/184356

*Al-Masry al-Yawm* (2012 August, 28) Al-Wasat Yanddam lil-Ikhwan fi al-Hugum 'al-Yassar'. Retrieved from http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=351203

*Al-Masry al-Yawm* (2012, December 26) Dr. Salah Hassaballah Ra'is Hezb al-Muwaten al-Masri: Taayinat al-Shurah Mukafa'at men al-Ikhwan lil-Ahzab al-Décor. Retrieved from https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/267399 (accessed 9 August 2017).

*Al-Shorouk* (2012, September 11) Fouad al-Badrawy: al-da'wa le iskat Morsi kalam ba'eed 'an al-siyasa. Retrieved from http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=11092012&id=bab319a4-f9ea-4c3a-968c-b7cf0618f9b5

*Al-Yawm al-Sabeh* (2011, December 4). Al-Ikhwan wal-Salafiyun Yuhadidun Sawiris bi-Rafaa Qadiya Deddahu. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/cE1jak

Angrist, M. P. (2013). Understanding the success of mass civil protest in Tunisia. *The Middle East Journal*, *67*(4), 547–564.

Asseburg, M., & Wimmen, H. (2016). Dynamics of transformation, elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world. *Mediterranean Politics*, *21*(1), 1–22.

Boubekeur, A. (2015). *The politics of protest in Tunisia: Instrument in parties' competition vs. tool for participation*. SWP Comments 13, March 2015. Berlin: SWP.

Boubekeur, A. (2016). Islamists, secularists and old regime elites in Tunisia: Bargained competition. *Mediterranean Politics*, *21*(1), 107–127.

Brownlee, J. (2007). *Authoritarianism in an age of democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brownlee, J., Masoud, T. E., & Reynolds, A. (2015). *The Arab Spring. pathways of repression and reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bunte, J. B., & Thaut Vinson, L. (2016). Local power-sharing institutions and inter-religious violence in Nigeria. *Journal of Peace Research*, *53*(1), 49–65.

Cavatorta, F. (2015). No democratic change.. and yet no authoritarian continuity. The inter-paradigm debate and North Africa after the uprisings. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, *42*(1), 135–145.

Cheeseman, N., & Tendi, B. (2010). Power-sharing in comparative perspective: The dynamics of 'unity government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, *48*(2), 203–229.

Colombo, S., & Voltolini, B. (2017). The EU's engagement with 'moderate' political Islam: The case of ennahda. *Middle East Centre Paper Series*, *19*(July), 2019.

Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, *2*(1), 115–144.

George, A., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hassan, M. (2013a). Institutional factors affecting party systems in new democracies: Endogenous or exogenous predictors? *Democratization*, *20*(4), 668–692.

Hassan, M. (2013b). 'Elections of the people's assembly, Egypt 2011/12'. *Electoral Studies*, *32*(2), 370–374.

Helal, A. (2010). *tatawoor al nizam al siyasy al masry*. Cairo: Al Dar Al-masriya Al-libnaniya.

Heydemann, S. (2016). Explaining the Arab uprisings: Transformations in comparative perspective. *Mediterranean Politics*, *21*(1), 192–204.
*Kapitalis* (2012, September 5). Tunisie. Hamed Karoui et Hamadi Jebali: des «amis de trente ans». Retrieved from http://www.kapitalis.com/majdi/?id=11598
*Karemalikom* (2012, June 23). Hassaballah: Millioniya li-Mounassarat Shafiq wal-Aaskari…. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/nw7rJm
Leach, W., & Sabatier, P. (2005). To trust an adversary: Integrating rational and psychological models of collaborative policymaking. *American Political Science Review*, *99*(4), 491–503.
Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Masoud, T. (2014). Egyptian democracy: Smothered in the cradle, or stillborn. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *XX*(2), 3–19.
*Masrawy* (2013, July, 8). Sabahi: Morsi algha zeyadat al-as'aar khawfan 'ala al-dosor. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/zKDgLU
*Masress* (2012, December 25). Fashal al-ra'ees Morsi fashal le thawrat yanayer. Retrieved from http://www.masress.com/elsaba7/39840
McFaul, M. (2002, January). The fourth wave of democracy *AND* dictatorship. Noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world. *World Politics*, *54*, 212–244.
McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (1996) The meanings of trust. *MISRC Working Papers Series*, 96–04.
Munck, G. L., & Leff, C. S. (1997). Modes of transition and democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, *29* (3), 343–362.
O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & L. Whitehead, L. (2013). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
PF (Popular Front) Press Release. (2013, July 1). Retrieved from http://front-populaire.org/?p=135
PF Press Release (2013, August 16). Retrieved from http://front-populaire.org/?p=2629
PF Press Release (2014, July 3). Retrieved from http://front-populaire.org/?p=3864
Putnam, R., with Leonardi, R, and Nanetti, R. (1993). *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rabie, A. H. (ed.). (2012). *daleel al nokhba al barlamaniya al masriya 2012*. Cairo: Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
Redissi, H. (2016). La Transition Politique en Tunisie. Entre Consolidation Démoratique et Autoritarisme Compétitif. In H. Redissi, A. Makni, A. Nouira, & T. Ben Chaabane (Eds.), *La Tunisie en Transition, des Élection au Dialogue National*. Tunis: Diwen Editions, 9–22.
Rothstein, B. (2000). Trust, social dilemmas and collective memories. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *12*(4), 477–501.
Rustow, D. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic mode. *Comparative Politics*, *2*(3), 337–363.
Saleh, O. (2013). al khareeta al hezbiya al gadedah fe masr. In H. Elsaeed, H. Megahed, M. Shawky, & S. Fawzy. (Eds.), *Managing the transition in Egypt: Political and*

*economic visions*. Cairo: Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 115–136.
SDP (Social Democratic Party) Press Release (2012, December 2). Retrieved from https://goo.gl/VrEbWa
SDP Press Release (2013, July 8). Retrieved from http://www.sudaress.com/hurriyat/116742
Silverman, D. (2012) *The Arab military in the Arab Spring: Agent of continuity of change?* The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=213671
Stepan, A. (2012). Tunisia's transition and the twin tolerations. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(2), 89–103.
Stepan, A. C., & Linz, J. J. (2013). Democratization theory and the "Arab Spring". *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(2), 15–30.
*Tunisien* (2014, October 30). Iza samahat al-ahzab al-hadetha be-tashkeel hokomah ma'a al-Nahda, sanahkom ma'ahom'. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/865bx9
Van Deth, J. W., & Zmerli, S. (2010). Introduction: Civicness, equality, and democracy —A "dark side" of social capital? *American Behavioral Scientist*, *53*(5), 631–639.
Zayed, A. (2005). *al nokhab al igtemaiya wal siyasiya: Madkhal nazary*. Cairo: Center for Arab and African Research.

## Appendix 1. Table of Interviewees per country

A. Egypt

| Ideology | Party | Interviewee, Place and Date of Interview |
|---|---|---|
| Islamists | Freedom and Justice Party | Founding member, former cabinet minister under Morsi, Istanbul, 29 July, 2015 |
| | | Former MP of the party and member of the MB's Shura Council, Cairo, 15 November 2012 |
| | the Salafist *al-Nour* Party | Leading representative, Alexandria, 17 September 2015 |
| | | Salafi leader and member of the 2012 Constituent Assembly, Cairo, 15 October 2012 |
| | *al-Wasat* Party | Party Spokesperson, Istanbul, 30 July 2015 |
| Secularists | *al-Wafd* | Member of Party Supreme Committee, Cairo, 31 August 2015 |
| | | Assistant Secretary General, Cairo, 22 August 2015 |
| | Social Democratic Party | Party Vice President, Cairo, 18 August, 2015 |
| | | Founding member, Cairo, 19 August, 2015 |
| | Free Egyptians Party | Founding member and member of the Committee for International and External Relations, Cairo, 23 August 2015 |
| | | Leading member, Cairo, 27 February 2013; 5 September 2015 |
| | Constitution Party | Party Spokesperson, Cairo, 31 August 2015 |
| | | Founder and Party Secretary for Public Action. He is also founder of *Kefaya* Movement and National Association for Change, Cairo, 22 May 2012 |
| Leftists | *al-Karama* | Secretary of Organisation, Cairo, 2 September 2015 |
| | Popular Current | Organizer of Hamdeen Sabahi's 2012 and 2014 Presidential Campaign, Cairo, 1 September 2015 |
| | | Secretary of Organization, Cairo, 15 September 2015 |
| | Socialist Popular Alliance Party | Party President, Cairo, 1 September 2015 |
| | Revolutionary Socialists | Leading member, Cairo, 23 October 2012 |
| | *Tagammu'* | Head of the Party's Advisory Council, former Secretary General, Cairo, 31 August 2015 |
| | | Member of the Political Bureau and Editor-in-chief of the party's newspaper, Cairo, 13 June 2012 |
| Old regime | *al-Muatamar* | Vice President and Spokesperson, Cairo, 24 August 2015 |

B. Tunisia

| Ideology | Party | Interviewee Names | Interviewee |
|---|---|---|---|
| Islamists | Ennahda | Rashid Ghannouchi | Leader of Ennahda, Tunis, 15 December 2014 |
| | | Rafik Abdelsalam | Former foreign minister (2011-2013) and leading member, Tunis, 18 December 2014; 5 October 2016. |
| | | Ali Larayedh | Former Prime Minister and leading member, Tunis, December, 2014; 10 October 2016. |
| | | Meherzia Labidi | First Vice President of the Constituent Assembly and leading member of Ennahda, Tunis, 15 December 2014 |
| Old regime/left | Nidaa Tounes (NT), | Hamadi Redissi | University professor and ex-member, Nidaa Tounes, Tunis, 16 December 2014 |
| | | Ridha Chennoufi | Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tunis and member of Nida Tounes, Tunis 16 December 2014 |
| | | Said Aidi | Former Minister of Health (2015) and leading member of Nidaa Tounes, Tunis, 15 December, 2014 |
| | | Zouhair Ben Amor | Municipal Deputy, Ezzahra, Tunis, 30 September 2018 |
| | | Mohamed Amine Echamekh | Local Committee Member, Hamman Ezzriba-Zghouan, Tunis, 15 November 2018 |

(*Continued*)

(Continued).

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Centre-left | Congress Party for the Republic (CPR) | Noura Ben Hassen | Deputy of CPR in the Constituent Assembly, Tunis, 17 December, 2014 |
| | Ettakatol | Wafa Madder | Member of Political Bureau, Tunis, 20 December 2014 |
| | Progressive Democratic Party (PDP); | Firas Jabloun | Co-Founder, Democratic Alliance and ex-PDP member, Tunis, 16 December, 2014 |
| | | Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou | Deputy of Democratic Alliance, Tunis, 15 December 2014 |
| | | Mehdi Ben Gharbia | Member of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and MP afterwards, ex-member of Ennahda in the 1980s and of PDP and founding member of the Democratic Alliance, Hamburg, 6 November 2014 |
| Far-left parties within the Popular Front (PF) | *al-Qotb* | Riadh Ben Fadhal | General Secretary and member of Majlis al-Umana, Popular Front, Tunis, 28 August 2015 |
| | Democratic Patriots' Movement | Mohammad Jmour | Deputy General Secretary, Tunis, 17 August, 2015. |
| **Experts** | | Mohamed Limam | Assistant Professor, Al-Manar University, Hamburg, 7 November, 2014 |
| | | Hana Ben Abda | Professor of public law at the Faculty of Law, Economics and Management Sciences of Jendouba-Tunisia, Hamburg, 5 November, 2014 |
| | | Hatem Chakroun | Expert and researcher, Observatoire Tunisien de la Transition Démocratique (OTTD), telephone, 24 November 2018. |